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DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY TO ESTABLISH THE
UNITARY OWNERSIuP REQUIRED FOR AN
IMPLIED EASEMENT
United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1974)
In order to secure Federal Housing Authority mortgage insurance1
defendant O'Connell formed Patricia Gardens, Inc., to build and oper-
ate an apartment complex. Eight years later the apartments were pur-
chased by the United States at a foreclosure sale. The Government subse-
quently discovered that it had not acquired ownership of two adjacent
parking lots used by apartment tenants. These lots were still owned ei-
ther by defendant or Jopat Realty Corporation in which defendant was
the majority stockholder.2 Ownership of the parking lots by the owner
of the apartments was necessary in order to comply with a local ordi-
nance.' The United States claimed easements by implication in these two
lots, but the federal district court denied the Government's claim.4 The
court reasoned that since the title to the three parcels was not vested in
the defendant at the time the apartment complex was built, the New
York requirement of unitary ownership had not been met.5 The Court of
I. United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329, 1331 (2d Cir. 1974), citing 24
C.F.R. § 232.17 (1959).
2. The confusion about who was the actual owner of the lots arose from defend-
ant's testimony at trial:
Q. Do you own it or does Jopat own it? A. I think Jopat owns it. I am
not sure now, I am not positive. I don't know whether it was transferred over
or not. Jopat owns it or I own it. It is either one of the two.
Q. You don't see too much difference in that though? A. No, sir.
Joint App. at 76a-77a, United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1974).
3. Joint App. at 125a, United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1974),
quoting P.EK sILL, N.Y. ZONING ORDINANCE § 3-20.7.3 (1960):
[Parking] spaces shall be in the same ownership as the use to which they are
accessory and shall be subject to deed restriction, filed with the County Clerk,
binding the owner and his heirs and assigns to maintain the required number
of spaces available either (a) throughout the existence of the use to which they
are accessory or (b) until such spaces are provided elsewhere.
The Peekskill Planning Commission approved the site plan in October 1960, when Patri-
cia Gardens had title only to the land on which the apartments were built. 496 F.2d
at 1331.
4. United States v. O'Connell, 358 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The Govern-
ment brought suit for a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions,
and damages.
5. Id. at 927-28. See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed6 and held: Sufficient unitary
ownership of land for purposes of an implied easement will exist, despite
a formal division of title, if the actual control and use of the parcels indi-
cates such unitary interest.7
In addition to rights in real property stemming from holding title, the
common law recognized easements as accessory rights.s In general,
easements permanently burden the land of a titleholder for the benefit of
another adjacent landowner. 9 Easements may arise by express grant,'0
by prescription,"' or by implication.'"
When a landowner conveys a portion of his land and retains an adja-
cent portion, an easement in the retained portion may be implied in favor
of the purchaser. 3 The law presumes that the parties contracted with
reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale,' 4 and
thus intended that the land be conveyed with the qualities attached by
6. The case was remanded to the district court for a decision on the facts using
the standards set by the court of appeals to determine unitary ownership.
7. United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. C. GALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 1 (10th ed. 1925) [herein-
after cited as GALE]:
In addition to the ordinary rights of property, which are determined by the
boundaries of a man's own soil, the law recognizes the existence, as accessorial
to these general rights, of certain other rights to be exercised over the property
of a neighbour, and therefore imposing a burden upon him.
9. Id.; J. GODDARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 1-18 (Am. ed. E. Ben-
nett 1880) [hereinafter cited as GODDARD].
10. GALE 34-112; GODDARD 92-127, 131.
11. GALE 186-244; GODDARD 131-83. An easement by prescription arises from
open, adverse possession of land for a prescribed statutory period of time. See generally
RESTATwEmNT OF PROPERTY §§ 457-64 (1944).
12. GALE 113-85; GODDARD 92-127.
13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 474 (1944); accord, GALE 119 (relating "modern
rule" in England as of 1911):
Where the owner of land grants or demises part of it, retaining the remainder
in his own hands, such a grant or demise will . . . impliedly confer on the
grantee or lessee, as appurtenant to the land granted or demised to him, ease-
ments over the land retained corresponding to the continuous or apparent
quasi-easements enjoyed at the time of the grant or demise by the property
granted or demised over the property retained.
Courts, however, do not favor implied easements because they are in derogation of
the rule that written instruments speak for themselves, they tend to fetter estates, and
they violate the policy of the recording acts. 25 AM. JoR. 2D Easements & Licenses § 24
(1966).
14. See, e.g., Curry v. Southwall Corp., 192 Okla. 590, 591, 138 P.2d 528, 529
(1943). RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476(g), (h), comment i (1944) (emphasis
added) modifies this presumption: "The fact that [land] was used in a particular way
is some indication that the parties contemplated its use in a similar way thereafter."
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the grantor.' If it is found that the grantee cannot fully enjoy the con-
veyed property without the right to a continuation of known uses over
the retained property, then an easement may be implied.' A grantee
may thus receive not only title to one parcel, but also a right to limited
use of the retained land appurtenant to the purchased land.
The common law prescribed four requirements necessary in order to
burden appurtenant real property with an implied easement.' 7 First, all
the relevant parcels must have been in unitary ownership.' 8 This re-
15. GALE 118:
[A landowner may have] permanently altered the quality of the two parts of
his heritage; and if, after the annexation of peculiar qualities, he alien one part
of his heritage, it seems but reasonable, if the alterations thus made are palpa-
ble and manifest, and in their nature permanent changes in the disposition of
the property so that one part thereby becomes dependent upon another, that
a purchaser should take the land with the qualities which the previous owner
had undoubtedly the right to attach to it.
It is not necessary, however, that the parties themselves actually intended to imply
an easement. "Each party to a conveyance is bound not merely to what he intended,
but also to what he might reasonably have foreseen the other party to the conveyance
expected." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476, comment j (1944). This presumption
of intention follows from the principle that "no man can derogate from his own grant."
GALE 114-15; 25 AM. JuR. 2D Easements & Licenses § 28 (1966).
16. GODDARD 109:
As a general rule, a grantee of land or of an easement is entitled by implied
grant to any easement in the land of the grantor, which is necessary to render
the land or easement granted capable of enjoyment to the full extent.
See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476(e), comment g (1944).
17. The New York case often cited as authority for these requirements is Jacobson
v. Luzon Lumber Co., 192 Misc. 183, 79 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 276 App.
Div. 787, 92 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949), affd, 300 N.Y. 697, 91 N.E.2d 724 (1950). See
also GALE 113-72; GODDARD 111-27; C. SmrTH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 404-05 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SMir & BOYER].
The Restatement of Property takes a different approach to implied easements. Sec-
tion 474 defines implied easements:
When land in one ownership is divided into separately owned parts by a con-
veyance, an easement may be created, within the limitations set forth in §§
475 and 476. .. by implication from the circumstances under which the con-
veyance was made, alone.
Under § 475 the conveyance upon which the easement is based must be effective to cre-
ate the estate: "IThe conveyance must satisfy the formal requisites established by local
law for the creation of an estate in land of the duration of that conveyed." Section
476 then lists eight factors (not meant to be exhaustive) to determine whether the cir-
cumstances under which the conveyance was made warrant the implication of an ease-
ment. Thus, the Restatement requires (1) unitary ownership followed by (2) severance
and legal conveyance of part of the land, but the relevance of other surrounding circum-
stances for the creation of an easement is left for the assessment of the court. New
York law, however, has established certain factors as mandatory. See 57 Micar. L. REv.
724 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Heyman v. Biggs, 223 N.Y. 118, 125, 119 N.E. 243, 245 (1918);
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quirement assures that only uses established by one with power to subor-
dinate one parcel for the benefit of another will accompany a convey-
ance. Historically, the only party with that ability was the owner of the
fee.' Thus, unitary ownership has been interpreted to mean that title to
both the conveyed and retained portions was vested in one party in fee
simple.20 Secondly, during the period of unitary ownership, a use must
have been established whereby one part of the land was made subordin-
ate to another. The holder of the dominant portion will retain use of the
servient parcel.2 Thirdly, to support an implied easement, the use must
Times Square Properties, Inc. v. Alhabb Realty Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (Sup. Ct.
1952), afrd, 282 App. Div. 1024, 126 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1953); Jacobson v. Luzon Lumber
Co., 192 Misc. 183, 79 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 787, 92
N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949), affd, 300 N.Y. 697, 91 N.E.2d 724 (1950).
19. GALE 215:
[Als the right claimed is in its nature not one of a temporary kind, but one
which permanently affects the rights of property in the servient tenement-it
follows that by the common law such grant can only have been legally made
by a party capable of imposing such a permanent burden upon the property-
that is, the owner of an estate of inheritance.
GODDARD 93 states: "And so it is held, that the grantor of an easement must be the
owner of the fee."
20. Westminster Investing Corp. v. Kass, 266 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1967) (com-
plaint claiming implied easement dismissed when no unity of ownership of two parcels
of land shown); Violet v. Martin, 62 Mont 335, 205 P. 221 (1922) (no easement in
road from property to public way when road crosses land of stranger); Green v. Collins,
86 N.Y. 246 (1881) (no easement in drain across adjoining land when grantor had no
interest or title to that land); McQuinn v. Tantalo, 41 App. Div. 2d 575, 339 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1973) (no easement across land of stranger); Curry v. Southwall Corp., 192 Okla.
590, 591, 138 P.2d 528, 529 (1943) ("Such an easement derives its origin from a grant
and cannot legally exist where the owner of the land over which it is claimed was never
seised of both tracts of land").
The term "title" appears to refer to either the legal or equitable titleholder. In United
States v. O'Connell, O'Connell, the mortgagor, was the legal titleholder.
Many cases state the need for unity of title before an easement may be implied and
then mechanically determine the result depending on where title rests, without any dis-
cussion of reasons for the requirement. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 251 N.C. 760, 112
S.E.2d 569 (1960) (complaint dismissed when testimony showed two tracts of land in-
volved rather than one, although husband o*ned one and wife owned other).
21. GALE 14-15. While easements may also be implied in favor of the grantor,
these "implied reservations" are less favored by the courts. RmrATEMENT oF PROPERTY
§ 476, comment c (1944) states: "[C]ircumstances which may be sufficient to imply
the creation of an easement in favor of a conveyee may not be sufficient to imply the
creation of one in favor of the conveyor."
While acknowledging that conveyances historically have been construed against the
grantor, Professor Powell notes a trend toward allowing implied reservations under the
same circumstances as implied grants.
This trend is desirable, since these easements are found in any case only by
an inference from the circumstances that both of the parties intended the prior
[Vol. 1975:201
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be plainly and physically apparent by reasonable inspection. Finally, the
particular use must affect the value of the estate benefited, the dominant
estate, and must be reasonably necessary to that estate.22
Since the principle case involved property owned both by an individu-
al and a corporation, the relationship between individual shareholders
and the corporate entity was relevant to the determination of whether
the unitary ownership requirement had been met. A corporation is con-
sidered to be a legal entity distinct from its shareholders.2" There are,
however, instances in which the corporate entity will be disregarded in
order to hold shareholders personally responsible for the acts of the cor-
poration.24 If a court finds that disregarding the corporate entity would
prevent fraud or violation of a statute, or would achieve equity,25 it will
quasi-easement to continue in use.... Adherence to the constructional rules
that the terms of a grant, should be construed strictly against the grantor, does
not require complete disregard of the constructional factors found in the cir-
cumstances of the conveyance. The function of covenants of warranty or of
covenants against incumbrances is to give assurances concerning the estate con-
veyed rather than to guide the construction of the conveyance as to the scope
of the rights conveyed.
3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, % 411 at 460-61 (P. Rohan ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as POWELL]. For a discussion of "quasi-easements," see 3 POWELL
1 411 at 449-52; SMrrH & BoYE 404.
22. Easements by implication are also known as easements by implied grant. GALE
113. Thus, a fifth requirement, always implicit if not stated, is that of severance of
the dominant from the servient parcel by a grant. 3 POWELL 411 at 450-52; SMITH &
DOYER 404.
Only the first requirement was found to be at issue in O'Connell. The district court
found that the latter two requirements had been met. 358 F. Supp. at 927. The court
of appeals noted that "[presumably the district court found that the second element was
met .... ." 496 F.2d at 1333.
23. H. HENN, LAW OF ComoRTioNs 107-11 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN];
N. _ ATrN, CORPOxlTIONs 65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LrrIN]; see, e.g., Rapid
Transit Subway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 259 N.Y. 472, 182 N.E. 145 (1932);
Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N.Y. 254, 144 N.E. 519 (1924); Lowendahl v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1936).
24. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S.
490 (1918); Bartle v. Home Owners Co-op., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1932); HENN 250-58;
LATTr 72-73.
25. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967); Automotriz del Golfo
de Calif. S.A. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Bartle v. Home Owners
Co-op., inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); International Aircraft Trading Co.
v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 79 N.E.2d 249 (1948); Jenkins v. Moyse,
254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930); Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div.
144, 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1936). Judge Sanborm's rule in United States v. Milwaukee Refrig.
Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905), is often quoted:
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examine corporate operations to determine whether the corporation
possesses an identity independent of its shareholders. 0 In New York,
courts have disregarded the corporate entity under the "instrumentali-
ty" theory,2T the "identity" theory,2 8 and the economic "enterprise enti-
ty" theory. 9
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is
that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or de-
fend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
See also Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. Rav. 496, 517
(1912):
When the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to
evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate
monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web
of entity, will regard the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-
doing, men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real persons.
26. It is often unclear what factors the courts rely upon to establish the existence
of shareholder-corporate identity. For a review of various approaches, see Dobbyn, A
Practical Approach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L. REv. 185
(1971) (criticizing current "scatter-gun" approach of courts and suggesting that share-
holder liability be found when shareholder has control of corporation and uses that con-
trol unjustly to defeat plaintiff's claim against corporation); Gillespie, The Thin Corpo-
rate Line: Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D.L. Rnv. 363 (1969) (case-by-
case approach to corporate entity problems must be maintained); Hamilton, The Cor-
porate Entity, 49 TExAs L. Rtv. 979 (1971) (reviewing theories of corporate entity and
offering four principles to guide decision of whether to disregard corporate entity). For
an historical -review of corporate entity theories, see Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pier-
son, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N.Y.S. 532 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
27. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 157, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76
(1936) (emphasis original) defines the idea of excessive shareholder control upon which
the instrumentality theory is based:
Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domina-
tion, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at
the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own ....
28. Mull v. Colt Co., 178 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 279 F.2d
25 (2d Cir. 1962); African Metal Corp. v. Bullova, 288 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E.2d 466 (1942);
Natelson v. A.B.L. Holding Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 183 N.E. 373 (1932). Basic to the iden-
tity theory are a failure to maintain formal barriers between individual and corporation
(or parent and subsidiary) and a unity of beneficial interest. If it can be shown that
individuals are carrying on a business as individuals and not as a corporation, they will
be responsible in their personal capacities. If the corporation is merely a "dummy" for
its individual stockholders, who are in reality carrying on a business in their individual
capacities for personal rather than corporate ends, then treating the corporation as an
agent of the stockholders is justified. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d
6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
29. Mull v. Colt Co., 178 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 279 F.2d
25 (2d Cir. 1962); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d
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In United States v. O'Connell30 the court of appeals, in contrast to the
district court,3 refused to limit the definition of unitary ownership to a
requirement that title be in one party at the time the apartment complex
was begun. The test adopted by the appellate court involved a two-fold
determination. First, did the shareholder or shareholders of these corpo-
rations evince such control over the corporate operations that they could
effectively do as they pleased with all the land?32 For example, could
they create a servitude on one parcel owned by Jopat or defendant (the
parking lots) for the benefit of another parcel owned by Patricia Gar-
dens (the apartment complex)? Secondly, were the three parcels used as
one unit, implying that there was in fact but one party in interest?
33 If
585 (1966). The economic "enterprise entity" theory is attributed to Professor Adolf
Berle. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L REv. 343 (1947).
While the identity theory focuses on a unity of interests between individual sharehold-
ers and a corporation, the enterprise entity theory focuses on a single economic enter-
prise that may be run by several different corporations.
30. 496 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1974).
31. 358 F. Supp. at 927:
[Tihe Government seeks to have this Court ignore the fact that title to the
properties was in different corporate entities and to pierce the corporate veil
solely for the convenience of the Government. By doing so, this Court would
do violence unnecessarily to the corporate and real estate law of the State of
New York ....
The petition of the United States presented three alternative grounds for implying an
easement. First, defendant could have been estopped from denying the easement because
he had represented to the original mortgagee and the FH-A that tenants had parking priv-
ileges on the land. Brief for Appellant at 24, United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329
(2d Cir. 1974). The district court reasoned, however, that the Government was the
party estopped because it -knew or should have known all of the surrounding circum-
stances at the time the mortgage insurance was provided. 358 F. Supp. at 928. The
court of appeals rejected the district court's position, but it did not speak to the Govern-
ment's estoppel argument. 496 F.2d 1334-35. For an application of the estoppel analy-
sis to a case involving an implied easement, see Curry v. Southwall Corp., 192 Okla.
590, 138 P.2d 528 (1923).
A second alternative was to disregard the corporate entity and vest legal title to Patri-
cia Gardens and Jopat property in defendant. Brief for Appellant at 13, supra. This
is the least acceptable approach given the necessity of recording title. Equity between
the two immediate parties could be achieved without this drastic approach which has
repercussions beyond the immediate parties. The court of appeals recognized this:
The separation of corporate and personal entities will be ignored only for
the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient unity of ownership to
allow implication of an easement.
496 F.2d at 1335.
The court chose the third alternative: disregarding corporate entity and redefining
unitary ownership. Id.
32. 496 F.2d at 1335.
33. Id.
207
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both these questions could be answered affirmatively, then there was
"sufficient unity of interest ' 3 4 among the several parcels to meet the New
York requirement of unitary ownership.
The establishment of an easement by implication upon the sharehold-
er's land required that the separate legal existence of the corporation be
disregarded. In order to reach a shareholder's assets for corporate obli-
gations, there must be sufficient reason, under the doctrine of disregard-
ing the corporate entity, to look beyond the corporate form. 8r Unlike the
district court, 6 the court of appeals found sufficient cause to question
the separate existence of the Patricia Gardens corporation. A local ordi-
nance required that a certain number of parking facilities be under the
same ownership as the apartment complex.3 7 Disregarding the corporate
entity would effect compliance with this ordinance, and thus equity
would be achieved for the Government. 8 Also, the facts strongly sug-
34. Id. This phrase of the court of appeals sums up the new approach; "interest"
has been substituted for "ownership." The court cited Cosmopolitan Nat'1 Bank v. Chi-
cago Title & Trust Co., 7 Ill. 2d 471, 131 N.E.2d 4 (1955), in support of its formulation.
496 F.2d at 1335. Although separate corporations had legal title to two lots, the Illinois
court held that sufficient common ownership existed to satisfy the unitary ownership re-
quirement because the use of the entire property had been arranged according to the
wishes of the two shareholders. The corporations were mere instrumentalities of the
individuals who were found to be the real parties in interest.
The O'Connell court distinguished New York cases brought to its attention. In Far-
ley v. Howard, 60 App. Div. 193, 70 N.Y.S. 51 (1901), afj'd, 172 N.Y. 628, 65 N.E.
1116 (1902), defendant owned all of one lot and a half interest in an adjacent lot. The
porch of his home encroached on the latter lot. When third parties bought the lots,
it was held that there was no implied easement in the adjacent lot because there had
been no unity of ownership. The O'Connell court distinguished the case by saying that
in O'Connell unity did not rest on a claim of 50% ownership by defendant but on a
claim of apparent complete dominance of the corporations by defendant. 496 F.2d at
1334.
In Times Square Properties, Inc. v. Alhabb Realty Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct.
1952), affd, 282 App. Div. 1024, 126 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1953), there had been unitary
ownership of two distinct parcels for a period of five years. It was not until after sever-
ance of ownership, however, that a platform encroaching on another property was con-
structed. The O'Connell court noted the Times Square trial court's dictum that since
the pieces of land had been treated as separate, there was no unity of ownership, al-
though legal title was at one point vested in one person. 496 F.2d at 1334.
35. As the general rule, a corporation is a separate legal entity and its shareholders
have limited liability for its obligations; it is only in extraordinary situations that this
entity will be disregarded. See sources cited notes 24-26 supra.
36. 358 F. Supp. at 928: "And the usual grounds for dispensing with the corporate
form, i.e., to prevent fraud or achieve equity, are not applicable to this case."
37. See note 3 supra.
38. A traditional interpretation of the ordinances term "ownership" to mean legal
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gested that the defendant shareholder was actually conducting the cor-
porate business in his individual capacity s9 Although the case was re-
manded for the factual determination of actual shareholder control, the
court of appeals concluded that New York corporate law did not pre-
clude the granting of an easement.4 0
Because the decision in O'Connell involved both an easement ques-
tion and a corporate entity question, it may have an impact in both fields.
First, the court listed a number of factors it considered relevant in deter-
mining whether its new test for unitary ownership had been met. These
factors included whether business between Jopat, defendant, and Patri-
cia Gardens was conducted at arm's length and whether others besides
defendant participated in the management.4 1 All of the factors focused
on locating actual control over, and interest in, the apartment complex
and parking lots, and thus were also directly related to the Government's
claim.
While these factors were listed to aid the district court in applying the
unitary ownership test, they were also relevant in a decision to disregard
the separate corporate entity of Patricia Gardens. Under New York law,
courts will disregard the corporate form when individuals fail to observe
formalities in their dealings with a corporation in which they have an
interest and when individuals dominate corporate activities for their per-
sonal gain.4 2 Many courts, however, fail to indicate the logical relation
between the plaintiff's claim and the factors relied upon to disregard the
corporate entity.43 The O'Connell court's analysis requires that the ele-
title, however, would lead to the conclusion that the ordinance's requirements could not
be met by disregarding the corporate entity. As the court of appeals was unwilling to
transfer legal title, see note 31 supra, ownership would have to be read to mean "inter-
est" rather than legal title. See note 34 supra.
39. 496 F.2d at 1334.
40. 495 F.2d at 1335: "We, therefore, conclude that nothing in New York's corpo-
rate law would prohibit the implication of an easement here if the conditions of our rule
are met."
41. Factors listed by the court were: Whether Patricia Gardens had paid rent for
the use of the two parking lots; whether there had been consideration when Patricia Gar-
dens received land for the apartment complex from Jopat or defendant; and what control
was exercised by stockholders other than defendant (if any). Id.
42. See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585 (1966).
43. See Dobbyn, supra note 26, at 188:
In an attempt to fortify their written opinions, courts have tended to use a scat-
ter-gun approach, lacing their opinions with every available fact that might in-
dicate unity in either the "control" or "interest" sense, regardless of its rele-
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ments of dominance and lack of formalities be related to the activities
complained of by the plaintiff. That is, corporate activities totally unre-
lated to the Government's easement claim, no matter how informally
conducted or how much they were influenced by one party, would be
irrelevant factors in the Government's suit. This analysis is a significant
step toward establishing more precise guidelines for disregarding the
corporate entity, a process now characterized by a "scatter-gun" ap-
proach.44
Secondly, establishing the requisite unitary ownership for an implied
easement may no longer necessitate establishing title to both parcels.
This definition of unitary ownership appears to be in harmony with the
original purpose of that requirement, although regrettably, the court of
appeals did not give an explanation of the relationship.4 5 The unitary
ownership requirement assures that a known use of the servient parcel
will be continued only when the conveyor had the ability to burden the
land permanently with such a use. That ability to manage and rearrange
land does rest in the titleholder. The court of appeals has recognized that
that ability may also be held by a shareholder who has complete control
vance to the appropriate issue-has the shareholder's action affected the plain-
tiff's ability to collect his legitimate claim?
44. Id.; see sources cited note 26 supra.
45. The court made no attempt to tie its test to the policy behind the unitary own-
ership requirement. Arguably, the dominance test also serves the purpose that the legal
title test has served in allowing easements only when the grantor had the power to bur-
den land as he pleased. It is unfortunate that this was not made clear, because the test
used by the O'Connell court has been specifically rejected in some eminent domain cases.
In these cases the mechanical test of legal title has been applied, irrespective of any evi-
dence that one party, in fact, controls the entire property, which is in fact used as one
entity.
In McIntyre v. Board of County Comm'rs, 168 Kan. 115, 211 P.2d 59 (1949), a hus-
band owned one tract of land and his wife another. Both parcels were used as one farm
unit and operated primarily by the husband. The court held that "[tiracts held by dif-
ferent titles vested in different persons cannot be considered as a whole where it is
claimed that one is incidentally injured by the taking of the other for a public use." Id.
at 119, 211 P.2d at 63.
In Gossett v. State, 417 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), three individuals owned
a corporation that in turn held a tract of land. Another tract was owned by two of
the three individuals while a third tract was held by the three individuals equally. The
entire area was to be used as a site for a shopping center, although construction had
not yet begun. The state took and paid for portions of the tracts owned by the individ-
uals, but it refused to compensate for the resultant decline in value of the corporation's
adjacent property. The court sustained the state's action by reasoning that there was
no identity of ownership in the tracts since the corporation was an entity separate from
its shareholders. Id. at 735.
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of the corporations holding title to the two parcels. To imply an easement
in such a case, when the facts point to domination of the corporations by
one party, does not jeopardize the rule that no easement will be implied
in the land of a stranger.46
The question of who has the right to burden land should not be an-
swered simply by establishing who has the title. Such a technical defini-
tion substitutes form for substance. The court of appeals has injected
sensitivity to modem corporate realities into an ancient property law
concept without sacrificing the purpose of the unitary ownership re-
quirement.
46. The unitary ownership requirement is sometimes defined in terms of protecting
the stranger, i.e. the legal titleholder who is affected by, but not a party to, a convey-
ance. Green v. Collins, 86 N.Y. 246 (1881).
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